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RECENT CASES
the Alaska Pacific Steamship Co. case, supra, consequently, would be
applied. If not adversaries within that rule, whether or not the judgment should be held res iudicata would turn on notice given the
other party or knowledge by him that he would be looked to for
indemnity, and his opportunity to defend.
The adversaries rule and the rule requiring notice and opportunity
to control the other party's defense should apply also where judgment
goes against both parties. If the defendants in the original action
were treated as adversaries and they were given a free reign in introducing evidence as to their differences, both would be bound under
the adversaries rule; "' otherwise, the judgment could be made binding,
as to matters actually adjudicated, only by notice and opportunity to
defend.
The controlling principles are well settled, but there is some confusion. Such confusion as exists has resulted from failure of the courts
to keep in mind the adversaries rule, that a judgment is binding on
both parties or neither, or that a judgment is not binding in the
liability-over action where the defendant had no knowledge that indemnity would be expected of him or had no opportunity to defend.
GEORGE D. LANTZ.
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CONTRACTS-RESTRAImT OF TRADE.-Plaintiffs purchased defendant's
stock in a company which operated a fleet of sight-seeing vehicles in
Seattle. The defendant orally promised and agreed not to engage in similar employment and solicitation of tourist business for any competing
company or hunself in the city of Seattle. Thereafter, defendant assisted
in organizing a competing company in Seattle and became active in solicitIng the patronage of tourists in that city. Held: That such a contract
limited as to space but unlimited as to time, is valid, and plaintiff is
entitled to an injunction. Barasi v. Johnson, 42 Wash. Dec. 64, 252 Pac.
680 (1927).
Such contracts are valid only when restricted as to time and to place,
and when reasonably necessary to the protection of the party in whose
interest they are made. Conversely stated, such contracts when without
limit as to time or place are invalid. Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. SwanLong V.
son, 76 Wash. 649, 137 Pac. 144, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 522 (1913)
Towl, 42 Mo. 545, 97 Am. Dec. 355 (1868).
Under the early English law, any voluntary restraint by contract by
an individual upon his right to carry on his trade or calling was void as
against public policy. Dyer's Case, Y. B. 2 Hen. V p. 5, pl. 26 (1415) Ipswhic
Tailor's Case, 11 'Coke 59a, 77 Reprint 1218. But under the modern English doctrine a covenant not to engage in a particular business limited to
twenty-five years in time and wholly unlimited in space, is valid if it is
coupled with a sale of the business and is necessary to protect the purchaser in what he has bought. Nordenfeldt v. Maxim Vordenfeldt Gun &
Ammunition Co., 63 L. J. Ch. 908 (1894), App. Cas. 535, 11 R. 1, 71 L. T.
489, 6 E. R. C. 413. In the United States, the courts have regarded a contract unlimited in both time and space as a total restraint of trade, and
void. Roberts v. Lemont, 73 Neb. 365, 102 N. W 770 (1905). And if the
=15 R. C. L. 1013-1014.
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contract, though limited as to time, is unlimited as to space, it is void.
Unson Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 193 Ill. 420, 61 N. E. 1038, 86 Am. St.
But even under the earlier rule in this country, an
Rep. 346 (1901).
agreement reasonably limited in space would not be void because unlimited in time. D-amond Match Co. v. Roeber 106 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E.
Tested by the rule of reason, a restrictive
419, 60 Am. Rep. 464 (1887)
covenant is not necessarily valid because it is limited in time and place.
Logically the corollary follows that by the same rule of reason, a restrictive covenant is not necessarily invalid because it is unlimited in time
and place. Hall Mfg. Co. v. Western Steel & Iron Works, 227 Fed. 588, 142
C. C. A. 220, L. R. A. 1916C, 620 (1915). The test is whether the restraint
is reasonably necessary to protect the purchaser in the enjoyment of the
particular business. Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507,
43 Atl. 723, 46 L. R. A. 255, 78 Am. St. Rep. 612 (1899)
Hall Mfg. Co. vi.
Western Steel d Iron Works, supra, Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber supra,
Nordenfeldt v. Maxim Nordenfeldt Gun & Ammunition Co., supra, 13
C. J. 475.
Although the rule as stated in Fisher Floursng Mills v. Swanson,
supra, would seem to require a limitation as to both time and place, the
holding in the principal case is consistent with the holding in Johnson
v. Schultz, 137 Wash. 584, 243 Pac. 644 (1926), where a similar contract
was upheld, and in accord with the great weight of authority that the
absence of a limitation as to time will not render the agreement invalid
if it is otherwise reasonable. Kramer v. Old, 119 N. C. 1, 25 S. E. 813, 56
Am. St. Rep. 650, 34 L. R. A. 389 (1896) Anders v. Gardner 151 N. C. 604,
66 S. E. 665 (1910)
Holliston v. Ernston, 124 Minn. 49, 144 N. W 415
(1913) Sklaroff v. Sklaroff, 263 Pa. 421, 106 Atl. 793 (1919)
Madson v.
Johnson, 164 Wis. 612, 160 N. W 1085 (1917) 13 C. J. 469, 470; 6 R. C. L.
799, 800. The rule is the same whether the business sold is commercial
or professional. Randolph v. Graham, 254 S. W (Tex. Civ. App.) 402
(1923) Tarry v. Johnson, 208 N. W (Nebr. 1926) 615.
M.W K
DAMAGES-LOSS OF PROFITS-ITIGATION OF DAMAGES.-The plaintiff,
a manufacturer of "Rapidol," a hair dye, entered into a contract with the
defendant whereby the defendant was granted an exclusive agency for
"Rapidol" in the Pacific Coast states, with the privilege of buying at a
preferential discount, and whereby it was to be furnished with advertising materials. The defendant agreed to handle no other hair dyes, to
use its best efforts to push the sale of "Rapidol," and to buy a certain
quantity each year. The plaintiff sued for goods sold and delivered and
the defendant counter-claimed for damages for loss of profits for breach
on the plaintiff's part in failing to supply advertising matter, refusing to
grant the preferential discount and allowing other dealers to vend "Rapidol" within the defendant's exclusive territory.
The defendant, after vainly attempting to persuade the plaintiff to
abide by its contract abandoned the handling of "Rapidol" and began to
sell "Dyart," a competing hair dye. The trial court found for the defendant on practically all of the issues and granted a judgment for some
$25,000 for loss of profits on the theory that the defendant's "Rapidol"
business was ruined. Held: There can be no recovery for loss of profits
in such a case. Rapsdol Co., Inc., v. Howe Co., Inc., 44 Wash. Dec. 431,
258 Pac. 469 (1927)
The decision is based on two grounds: (1) That inasmuch as the
defendant could have gone ahead and sold "Rapidol" and only lost a 5%
preferential discount and the exclusive feature of its contract, there is
no justification for the trial court's finding that the defendant's business
in "Rapidol" was "destroyed and prostrated"- (2) that the defendant
was bound to mitigate its damages by securing another dye to handle,
which it did, and since there was no evidence as to the profits it would
make handling this dye, the loss caused by plaintiff's acts is speculative.
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If the court had decided the case on the first ground alone one might
be disposed to agree with the result. Damages for loss of profits for
violation of an exclusive feature of a contract are difficult to prove and
rarely recoverable. See American Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Hart, 2 Wash.
594, 27 Pac. 468 (1891). It might well be argued, however, that the plaintiff's breach of contract was so serious that the defendant could treat it
as a repudiation of the entire contract and recover as for a total breach.
This was done in a similar case, Warner v. Channell Chemical Co., 121
Wash. 237, 208 Pac. 1104 (1922).
As to the second point it is submitted that this is not a contract of
employment, and under the circumstances there is no duty to mitigate the
damages by selling other dyes. It would seem that the defendant is
entitled to the profits of this particular contract, regardless of others he
might make. See Watson v. Grays Harbor Brick Co., 3 Wash. 283, 28
Pac. 527 (1891), which is irreconcilable with the instant case.
In general see Recovery for Loss of Profits in Washington, 2 WAsr.
L. REv. 169.
0. C. H. in.
EirIENT DoI.iN-INmJun

G PROPERTY NOT TAExh-RmEEEDY

OF LAND

OwNs.M-The plaintiff brought an action against the City of Seattle for
damages to real property, alleged to have been caused by a slide resulting
from the removal of lateral support by the city in its regrade of certain
adjacent streets some years before. The city, under the city charter,
sought to limit the recovery in the action to the damages occurring within
a period beginning thirty days prior to the filing of a claim for damages,
as required by the city charter. The trial court refused to allow such a
restriction to be placed upon the recovery and the city appealed from
this holding. Held: The trial court was correct in its holding since the
damage in this case was within the constitutional provision of Article 1
§ 16 of the Constitution of the State of Washington, and a city charter
could not limit the right to compensation given by the constitution.
Wong Kee Jun. v. City of Seattle, 43 Wash. Dec. 364, 255 Pac. 645 (1927).
The principal case is significant in that it re-states the former deci,
sions on the question involved and attempts to establish a uniform rule
whereby courts and litigants may be guided in the future. In the early
case of Postel v. Seattle, 41 Wash. 432, 83 Pac. 1025 (1906), the rule was
announced that the city charter, requiring claims for damages against the
city to be presented within thirty days from the time the claims accrue,
governed in a case where damages resulted from the grading of a street
by the city, and that no difference existed between such claims and those
resulting from personal injuries. The court in the case of Kincaid v.
Seattle, 74 Wash. 617, 134 Pac. 504, 135 Pac. 820 (1913), refused to follow
the Postel case, although not expressly overruling it, and held that whenever the damage caused was such that it could or should have been a
proper subject for eminent domain proceedings in a condemnation suit
by the city, the city under its power of eminent domain could have condemned the property as to the damage caused, and therefore having the
lawful right to do such damage and having failed to exercise such legal
right, it could not be heard to say that the damage was wrongful or
tortious and therefore limit the recovery under the city charter or ordinance. It was therefore held that the city charter limiting the amount
of recovery to the damages accruing within thirty days prior to the filing
of the claim with the city was not applicable where the damage done
should have been compensated for in a condemnation suit. In Casassa v.
Seattle, 75 Wash. 367, 134 Pac. 1080 (1913) the court made a distinction
between a claim for damages where there had been no condemnation proceedings, as in the Kincaid case, and a claim for damages where a condemnation had been had but had not been extensive enough to cover the
damage caused by the work on the improvement; the court holding that
in the former case a recovery could be had regardless of filing a claim
with the city; while in the latter case the damage was done tortiously and
a claim must be filed as required by the city charter.
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In the principal case the court reviews the holdings in the Postel,
Kincazd and Casassa cases, supra, together with many others, and decides
that the limitation or dividing line set in the Casassa case was too narrow and not well founded, and that the rule in Washington in such cases,
henceforth should be that where the damage is such as could have been
compensated for in a condemnation proceeding, regardless of whether one
was actually had or not, the right to compensation is guaranteed by the
Constitution and the city may not claim that the damage was done tortiously and plead that provision of the city charter requiring claims to
be filed within thirty days of the accrual thereof, to limit or bar the right
G. DE G.
of action or recovery
JUDGMiENTs-LIENx OF JUDGMENTS OF UNITED STATES CouRTs.-A

statute

of Missouri purported to make the lien of judgments rendered in the
United States courts effective from the time when a transcript of such
judgment was filed in the office of the county clerk, while the lien of
judgments in the state trial courts of record took effect from the time of
rendition of the judgment. Held: This is a discrimination against the
judgments of the United States courts, and hence not in conformity with
the Act of Congress of August 1, 1888, Chap. 29 (U. S. C. Tit. 28 § 812)
so that it is ineffective and federal judgments effect a lien on all real
property within the judicial district where rendered, even though not filed
71 L. ed.
U. S.in the county clerk's office. Rhea v. Smith, (Adv.) 839, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 698 (1927).
The Missouri statute in question is essentially similar to that existing
in Washington (Rem. Comp Stat. § 445, P C. § 8111) so that the probable
result of the principal case is to make unnecessary the filing of the
transcript contemplated by our statute. The decision appears to affect
not merely lands within the county in which the federal judgment is
rendered, but all lands within the district alike. The result is to place
the law in the same inconvenient and unfair position as before the Act of
1888 (U. S. C. Tit. 28 § 812). For a discussion of the whole matter with
the reasons which led to that legislation see HACKMAN, The Lien of Judgments of United States Courts zn Washington, 2 WAsH. L. REV. 89.
An opinion contrary to the result reached in the principal case was
ventured in that article. The court could quite as reasonably have reached
an opposite conclusion, and one more conducive to the public convenience.
It would seem highly desirable, certainly that the effect of the principal
case be avoided in Washington, either by judicial construction of our
statute, or by new legislation.
It should be observed that in distinguishing the case of In re Jackson
Light and Traction Co., 269 Fed. 223 (1920), the court intimates that if
the state judgments constitute a lien only from the time they are "enrolled" by the county clerk, and the same rule applied to federal judgments, that that would be a sufficient conformity with the Act of 1888
(U. S. C. Tit. 28 § 812), and hence a valid provision. It might well be
urged that such is the effect of the Washington statute, since under the
decisions it may be construed to mean that the judgments of neither the
Superior or Federal Courts effect a lien until indexed by the clerk.
Goetzinger v. Rosenfeld, 16 Wash. 392, 47 Pac. 882, 38 L. R. A. 257 (1897)
0. B. K.
2 WASH. L. REV. 89, 97.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS-CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF STATE TO MODIFY.-A
statute of Wisconsin provided that no power dam might be built in any
navigable water except on condition that the state might acquire it on
certain payments made. The abutting owner claimed the right to use
the water for power as a riparian property right which the state could
not infringe consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment. Held: The
state courts having held that there was no such property right, and there
being no showing of any attempt to evade the constitutional issue, there
is not a taking of property without due process of law. Fox River Paper
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47 Sup.
Co. v. Railroad Commsssion of Wisconsmn, - U. S., - L. ed. Ct. Rep. 669 (1927).
The law of riparian rights has had a somewhat chaotic development
in the United States, with a wide variation of decision in different states.
Shtvely v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 38 L. ed. 331 (1894) 1 TiF~A-xy, REAL PsoPERTY (2nd ed.) §§ 1009, 1010, 1012; GOULD, WATE S, Ch. 3. There is not
even agreement as to the nature of these extraterritorial rights, whether
they are properly to be called property rights or are only privileges. In
re Hood River 227 Pac. (Ore.) 1065 (1924) Stevens v. Paterson Ry., 34
N. J. L. 532 (1870) Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 19 L. ed. 984 (1869)
Browning v. Hooper, 269 U. S. 396, 70 L. ed. (Adv.) 149, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep.
7 COL. L. REV. 413; 4 HARV. L. REv. 14, LEWIS, EmINENT
141 (1926)
Dom-iin § 83 et seq. As a result there has been much dispute as to the
power of the state to take away or modify these riparian rights. It seems
to be generally recognized that they are subordinate to the needs of navigation, and may be destroyed to facilitate it, even without compensation.
Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578, 41 L. ed. 996
(1897). But this does not negative their being property rights incapable
of modification by statute. Browning v. Hooper supra. Once it is decided
as a matter of common law that they are property rights, they may not
be taken away without compensation. Nielson v. Spooner, 46 Wash. 14,
81 Pac. 155 (1907) Appleby v. City of New York; 271 U. S. 364, 70 L. ed.
GOULD, WATERS, § 281.
992, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 569 (1925)
But where the state courts declare, as a matter of common law, that
there are no riparian rights incident to certain property, then the Supreme
Court of the United States has no concern with the matter. Port of
Seattle v. Oregon Washington R. Co., 255 U. S. 56, 65 L. ed. 501, 41 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 235 (1920) Bourquillas, etc., Co. v. Curtis, 213 U. S. 339, 53 L. ed.
The greatest difficulties arise where
822, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 494 (1908).
the state courts change their own rules of decision, as they have more
often in this branch of the law of property than in most others. Their
power to divest, by subsequent decision, property rights long considered
settled has often been disputed. See quotations in 1 WmrL, WATER RiGHTs
mi WE:sRx STATES (3rd ed.) § 174. But this would seem to be necessarily within the power of those charged with authoritatively declaring the
common law, and to deny it to the state courts would be to transfer that
responsibility to the Supreme Court of the United States, a result impractical and repugnant to our constitutional system. Of course, the usual
rule is that an overruled decision cannot be the basis of a constitutional
claim; Cross Lake Club v. Louisiana, 224 U. S. 632, 56 L. ed. 924, 32 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 577 (1912), though there have been occasional lapses when the
Supreme Court has overruled its prior decisions and departed from its
general rule in order to reverse a state court for having disregarded one
of its prior decisions. See Muhlker v. Harlem . R., 197. U. S. 544, 40
L. ed. 872 (1905).
Whether or not a given statute deprives a person of property very
often depends on whether or not by the pre-existing common law he had
any property. The principal case is an application to the law of riparian
rights of the principle that the state court's determination of that common law will not be disturbed except where there is reason to suspect
that the ground given is not the true one influencing the court, but that
the court is in fact giving weight to the statute. Terre Haute R. B. v.
Ward
Indiana, 194 U. S. 579, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 767, 48 L. ed. 1124 (1903)
v. Love County, 253 U. S. 506, 64 L. ed. 751, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419 (1919)
Nichol v. Cole, 256 U. S. 222, 65 L. ed. 900, 41 Sup. St. Rep. 467 (1920).
This rule is one of much importance, since in such leading cases in the
law of riparian rights as Bisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539,
18 L. R. A. 332 (1891) In re Hood River, supra, and Proctorv. Sims, 134
Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114 (1925), it is very difficult to decide whether or
not the court is deciding on the strength of common law or statute.
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Where the constitutional claim is of the impairment of a contract
rather than under the Fourteenth Amendment, the rule is somewhat different. In such cases the Supreme Court seems willing to go to the most
extreme lengths in substituting for the opinion of the state court its own
interpretation of the common law found in prior state decisions. See
Houston & Texas Cent. R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 44 L. ed. 673, 20 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 543 (1899) Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U. S. 364, 70 L. ed.
The latter case shows how the con992, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 569 (1925).
tract clause, as construed in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. ed. 162
(1810), can often be used to protect riparian rights as well as other kinds
0. B. K.
of property, and is not at all confined to contracts.
SALES-WARANTY-SEED-DISCLAIMER or WARRANTY.-Plaintiff sought
to purchase spring rye for seeding from S. Company in Spokane, but it
was unable to furnish it. Plaintiff then informed S. that he had heard
that someone in Walla Walla had spring rye. S. said he knew who it
was, and wrote to G. Co. in Walla Walla, which answered that it could
supply seed wanted. S. then wrote to plaintiff, who immediately answered
ordering 1500 pounds at price named. S. sent order to G., who shipped
direct to plaintiff, no invoice being sent and there being no communication
between plaintiff and G. Plaintiff sent check for amount due to S. On
each bag of seed received by plaintiff from G. there was a tag; on one
side, the address to which consigned, and on the other, in plain print the
express or
following: "Garden City Feed Mills gives no warranty
implied, as to description, quality, productiveness, or any other matter, of
any seeds it sends out, and will be in no way responsible for the crop."
Plaintiff saw these tags and read them. The seed was fall rye instead of
spring rye. Action against both S. and G. The trial court granted
motions of both defendants dismissing the action as to each defendant
after plaintiff's testimony was in, upon appeal the ruling of the trial
court was affirmed, court holding that S. was agent of plaintiff in making
the purchase and that G. was released from any liability upon implied
warranty of description by the disclaimer attached to each bag of seed.
Larson v. Inland Seed Go., 43 Wash. Dec. 424, 255 Pac. 919 (1927).

The early doctrine of Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep.
3 (1791), wherein it was held that a sale of a "bezoar" stone by name
did not warrant that it was such stone, has been much criticized and has
been materially modified, if not overruled, in the original jurisdiction
and only followed in a few instances in the United States. 24 R. C. L. 171.
The later cases have in practically all instances tended toward the doctrine that if a dealer sells an article, describing it by name of an article
of commerce, the identity of which is not known to the buyer, he must
understand that the buyer relies thereon, and is held to warrant that
the article is that named. UNiFoRm SALEus ACT, § 14, SALE OF GOODS
24 R. C. L. 173. This theory is borne out by the weight
ACT, § 13 (Eng.)
of authority both English and American, in cases involving sales of
seeds. Winter-Loeb Grocery Co. v. Boykin, 203 Ala. 187, 82 So. 437 (1919)
Miller v. Germain Seed and Plant Co., 193 Cal. 62, 222 Pac. 817 (1924)
Lehner v. Germain Seed and Plant Co., 193 Cal. 782, 222 Pac. 834 (1924)
Blizzard Bros. v. Growers, Canning Co., 152 Ia. 257, 132 N. W 66 (1911)
Gardner 'v. Winter 117
Phillips v. Vermillion, 91 Ill. App. 133 (1900)
Ky. 382, 78 S. W 143, 63 L. R. A. 647 (1904) Hobdy & Read v. Siddens,
Van Wyck v. Allen, 5 Daly (N. Y.)
198 Ky 195, 248 S. W 505 (1923)
Landreth V'.
Gubner v. Wick, 6 N. Y. St. Rep. 3 (1886)
376 (1876)
Wyckoif, 67 App. Div. 145, 73 N. Y. S. 388 (1901) White v. Miller, 71
Wolcott v. Mounts, 38 N. J. L. (9
N. Y. 118, 27 Am. Rep. 13 (1877)
Fuhrman v. Interior Warehouse
Vroom) 496, 20 Am. Rep. 425 (1875)
Co., 64 Wash. 149, 116 Pac. 666 (1911) Kelly v. Lum, 75 Wash. 135, 134
Seattle Seed Co. v. Fujimom,
Pac. 819, 49 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1151 (1913)
79 Wash. 123, 139 Pac. 866 (1914) Ross v. Northrup, 156 Wisc. 327, 144
N. W 1124 (1914) Allen v. Lake, 18 Q. B. 560, 83 E. C. L. 560 (Eng.)
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24 R. C. L. 175, 24 R. C. L. 199; 2 MEocHEm, SALES, 1149; Ann.
(1852)
Cas. 1918B, 75, 16 A. L. R. 871, Contra,Kirchner v. Conrad, 9 Mont. 191, 23
Calhoun v. Brznker,
Pac. 74, 18 Am. St. Rep. 731, 7 L. R. A. 471 (1890)
Kingbury v. Taylor, 29 Me. 508, 50 Am. Dec. 607
17 Ohio Dec. 705 (1L907)
Shisler v. Baxter 109 Pa.
Lord v. Grow, 39 Pa. St. 88 (1861)
(1849)
St. 443, 58 Am. Rep. 738 (1885).
But it is conceded in those jurisdictions which adhere to the majority
doctrine that the seller may discharge himself from liability by a disclaimer of warranty. Kibbe v. Woodruff, 94 Conn. 443, 109 Atl. 169
(1920) Leonard Seed Co. v. Crary Cannsng Co., 147 Wise. 166, 132 N. W
Calhoun v.
902, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 79, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1077 (1911)
Brinker, supra, Seattle Seed Go. v. Fujimor, supra, Blizzard Bros. v.
Growers' Cannsng Go., supra, Yandell v. Anderson d- Spilman, 163 Ky.
Ross v. Northrup, King & Co., supra,
702, 174 S. W 481 (1915)
ManglesLongino v. Thompson (Tex. Civ. App.) 209 S. W 202 (1919)
dor Seed Co. v. Busby, 118 Okla. 255, 247 Pac. 410 (1926). These decisions are based upon common law principles, the Sales Act being silent
as to disclaimer of warranty.
In England the opposite result has been reached by construing conformance with the description as a condition to the contract rather than
a warranty implied by law and accordingly disclaimer of warranty does
not relieve the seller from compliance with this condition. Wallis v.
Pratt, (1911) A. C. (Eng.) 394; 1 WimSTON, SALES (2nd ed.) 477, note
98; 1 WH sxo, CONRACTS, 164, See. 90d; 2 MECunii, SALEs, 1146. The
only American case which reaches this result seems to be Smith v. Oscar
H. Will & Co., 51 N. D. 357, 199 N. W 861 (1924).
As to what will constitute sufficient proof of disclaimer of warranty
on the part of the seller to relieve him from liability, there seems to be
some difference in the authorities. Where the contract states that seller
does not warrant, the seller is clearly released. Leonard Seed Co. v.
Crary Cannsng Co., supra. In the following cases notice of disclaimer
in manner indicated was found sufficient: Catalogue, invoice, and shipping tag-Ross v. Northrup, King d Co., supra, order blank-Kibbe v.
Woodruff, supra, Manglesdorf Seed Co. v. Busby, supra, Manglesdorf
tags attached
Seed, Co. v. Williams, 118 Okla. 258, 247 Pac. 413 (1926)
to goods and general custom of trade not to warrant-Seattle Seed Co.
v. Fujimnor, supra, Smith v. Oscar H. Will & Co., supra, custom of trade
without other notice-Miller v. Germatn Seed & Plant Co., supra (Seawell
and Lawler, JJ., dissenting, Seawell's opinion giving an extended discussion of authorities) Blizzard Bros. v. Growers' Canning Go., supra,
contra, American Warehouse Co. v. Ray (Tex. Civ. App.), 150 S. W
763 (1912).
It is generally held that notice of disclaimer must be brought to the
attention of the buyer, or be in such a manner or place that the buyer
should have reasonably seen it. Amzz Godden Seed Co. v. Smith, 183 Ala.
Coats 'v. Harvey, 17 N. Y. St. Rep. 389, 2 N. Y. S.
286, 64 So. 100 (1913)
Sanford
5 (1888) Bell v. Mills, 78 App. Div. 42, 80 N. Y. S. 34 (1902)
v. Brown Bros. Co., 208 N. Y. 90, 101 N. E. 797, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 778
Vaughan's Seed Store v. Strngfellow, 56 Fla. 708, 48 So. 410
(1913)
Landreth v. Wyckoff, 67 App. Div. 145, 73 N. Y. S. 388 (1901)
(1904)
Ross v. Northrup, King & Co., supra.
Where fraud is involved in the disclaimer the court gives no effect
to such disclaimer. Woodward v. Rice Bros. Co., 110 Misc. 158, 179 N.
Y. S. 722, affirmed 193 App. Div. 971, 184 N. Y. S. 958 (1920). Suggested
in Leonard Seed Co. v. Crary Canning Go., supra, and in main case.
The seller is held not to have the right to subsequently disclaim a
warranty by means of statements printed on tags, invoices, or letter-heads
where there was an express warranty by the seller to the buyer when
the contract was entered into. Ann. Cas. 1918B, 81, Edgar v. Jos. Breck,
etc. Corp., 172 Mass. 581, 52 N. E. 1083 (1899) Amzi Godden Seed Co. v.
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Smith, supra, Coates v. Harvey, supra, Hobdy & Read v. Siddens, supra,
Longino
National Seed Co. v. Leavall, 202 Ky. 438, 259 S. W 1035 (1924)
v. Thompson, supra, Moorhead v. Minneapolis Seed Co., 139 Minn. 11,
165 N. W 484, L. R. A. 1918 C, 391, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 481 (1917) Ward v.
Volker 44 N. D. 598, 176 N. W 129 (1920)
Also it has been held that where tags containing a disclaimer of
warranty are placed upon the seed bags by wholesale dealer, this disclaimer does not operate to relieve the retail dealer who sells the same
bag with the tag still attached, the implied warranty of description is
effective in such a-case. Jolly v. Blackwell, 122 Wash. 620, 211 Pac. 748
(1922).
In the main case it was contended by the plaintiff that the facts
brought it within the rule of Jolly v. Blackwell, but the court decided
that the Inland Seed Company acted merely as agents, thus putting the
case squarely within the rule announced in Seattle Seed Company v.
Fujimort, supra, and the main case was decided in accordance therewith;
which seems to be in accord with the general authority in the United
A. E. H.
States.

BOOK REVIEWS
By Roger W Cooley. Fifth
edition. St. Paul: West Publishing Company 1926. Two vols. in
one. pp. xxvi, 700; 1085.
The reviewer had the pleasure of reviewing for the first issue of this
journal the fourth edition of Professor Cooley's work on Brief-Making
and the Use of Law Books, which was published in two volumes.
The fifth edition of this meritorious work has the decided advantage
of being more compact and easy to handle. The two volumes have been
combined into one book, thereby eliminating the extra bulk of a second
volume.
This edition bears the evidence of the more careful editorial work
in the second part of the book which deals with the specimen or illustrative pages taken from the publications of the various law writers and
which are used to provide a visualization of the form and substance of
these works. These pages include signatures from such standard sets
as Corpus Juris, Ruling Case Law Lawyers' Reports Annotated, American and English Annotated Cases, the American Digest, the National Reporter System, etc.
If it be true that the eye must lead the hand, then in the use of
these tools the legal profession the eye must first observe the plan,
content, and method of the work in question and be able to direct the
hand in the mechanical phase of the solution of the legal problem.
The selection of the illustrative material has largely been the work
of Mr. Lafayette S. Mercer, who has given toward the perfection of the
work the benefit of his years of teaching of legal bibliography. The
result represents a broader and more comprehensive type of material
than has appeared in previous editions.
In the teaching of legal bibliography the instructor should aim to
present the material of the various publishers as nearly as possible in
the manner in which the publisher desires the material to be presented
and from their point of view-thus evincing an attitude of fairness and
impartiality toward all publications. No instructor can permit himself
to entertain any bias toward any instrumentality having for its object
the better solution of the legal problem. As an example of this impartial
treatment of the subject of legal bibliography and research Professor
Cooley's treatise stands the test.
The reviewer, in his teaching of legal bibliography and research,
has formed the opinion that the best success is to be had when the
instructor is to follow as closely as possible upon the scientific and laboraBRIEF-MAKING AND THE USE oF LAw BooKs.

